Whereas the supply of redistribution is relatively easy to measure, the determinants of the demand for redistribution are controversially discussed in international literature. Economic theory typically models redistribution as the result of a voting mechanism; this is only inadequately reflected by the existing empirical studies. In general, these studies use survey data and are therefore not able to predict individuals' decision making under the restriction of a budget constraint. This study aims at eliciting preferences for redistribution in Germany with the help of a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE), based on a representative sample of 1,538 individuals. A DCE solves the aforementioned problems by forcing individuals to overcome trade-offs. The results show a strong preference for redistribution that overshoots the current level. Considering socio-demographic characteristics, the results contradict the Meltzer-Richard-Model and the POUM hypothesis, while Piketty's learning model is strongly supported by the data.
Motivation
In Germany, as in most industrialized countries, income inequality has steadily increased (see OECD 2011a (see OECD , 2011b . The government tries to affect the pre-tax income distribution by collecting taxes and granting monetary transfers. By doing so, income inequality between pre-tax and net incomes is reduced by about 40 % on average in Germany as measured by the Ginicoefficient (see Pfarr 2013 , p. 3, SVR 2011 . This strong governmental involvement calls for a detailed analysis of redistributive policies. Whereas the supply of redistribution is relatively easy to measure, the determinants of the demand for redistribution are controversially discussed in international literature. According to Alesina and Glaeser (2004) , most studies cover economic, institutional or behavioral factors. This study concentrates on the economic factors encompassing the traditional Meltzer-Richard hypothesis and the social mobility hypothesis.
In economic theory, redistribution is usually interpreted as the result of a voting mechanism.
Individuals express their demand for redistribution in line with their preferences, and political parties act as the supplier thereof. Most of the existing literature concentrating on the determinants for individuals' redistributive preferences is not able to differentiate between these two sides. Moreover, as these studies use survey data, they cannot predict individuals' decision making under the restrictions of their budget constraint.
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, the paper aims at eliciting preferences for redistribution in Germany with the help of a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE), based on a representative sample of 1,538 individuals. Second, the Meltzer-Richard and the social mobility hypotheses are revisited. The unique dataset allows to solve the problems mentioned above as the respondents were forced to overcome trade-offs. 3 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following paragraphs give a brief overview of the German redistributive system. Section 2 discusses the related theoretical and empirical literature and underlines the significance of the contribution. The following section focuses on the methodology applied with a short description of the implemented choice experiment. The empirical analysis is presented in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes and derives policy implications.
The redistributive system in Germany can be roughly classified in redistribution on the benefit side and on the funding side. Social benefits are granted with means testing (e.g. social welfare or housing subsidy), without means testing (e.g. child benefit) or as insurance benefit (e.g. unemployment insurance or health insurance) (see Pimpertz et al. 2009 ). These social benefits can be either direct monetary transfers or indirect monetary transfers, i.e. tax expenditures. On the funding side, the progressive income tax implies an interpersonal redistribution and goes along with earnings-related social security contributions. Taken together, the average personal tax and social contribution deduction is 30 % of the personal gross income (see Pfarr 2013, p. 140) . A proxy for the extent of redistribution is the sum of social benefits in relation to the GDP. In Germany, this amounts to about 30 % in 2010, i.e. circa 760 billion euros (see BMAS 2011) . This budget is financed by the contributions of employers and employees to the various social security schemes as well as tax subsidies. These subsidies amount to about 36 % of the total budget available for redistribution in 2010 (see BMAS 2011 and Pfarr 2013, p. 27) . Looking at the different groups of beneficiaries, 40 % of the social benefits are allotted to retirees and 35 % to the sick and to people in need of long-term care.
The unemployed and families with children each account for about 10 %. Finally, about 5 % are dedicated to the working poor (see BMAS 2011 and Pfarr 2013, p. 23 ).
Summarizing, redistribution in Germany is very high and motivated by the political agenda, i.e. reforms of the unemployment insurance, the statutory health insurance or the statutory pension insurance scheme (for example Boeckh et al. 2011) . Over the past decades an abundance of political interventions in the social security system which in part have serious consequences for the nature and extent of redistribution. This raises the question of whether the current redistributive system is at all desired in this form. To be successful, political reforms of the welfare state have to be aligned with citizens' preferences. Conversely, without a majority of supporters, reforms cannot be implemented. Thus, this paper could help to indicate where and how to achieve majorities.
Related Literature

The Meltzer-Richard and social mobility-hypothesis
The best known economic model to describe individuals' preferences for redistribution is the standard Meltzer-Richard-Model (MRM; Meltzer and Richard 1981) originally established by Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977) . The MRM is based upon the intuitive idea that the current income position of an individual is decisive when voting for a future redistributive taxation.
In the simplified framework of Persson and Tabellini (2000, pp. 118-121) utility maximizing individuals only differ with respect to their personal income and overall governmental activity 3 is limited to redistribution. Individuals are both economic agents and at the same time voters that have to vote on a redistributive proportional taxation and a lump-sum transfer. 4 Given the model in Persson and Tabellini (2000, p. 120) , the optimal tax rate of individual
with an individual's personal pre-tax income α i and the mean income of the society μ.
represents the marginal costs of a higher tax rate and is always negative because of the negative consequences of a higher tax rate for the average labor supply ()
The interpretation of (2.1) is straightforward: the lower the pre-tax income of individual i in relation to the average income, the higher is the preferred level of taxation and redistribution respectively. This result is intuitive as individuals with an income below the average income gain from an extended redistribution, i.e. they are net beneficiaries. Following Corneo and Grüner 2002 this voting behavior is called homo-oeconomicus-effect. 5 As the focus is on individuals' preferences, the following first hypothesis is derived from the MRM:
The lower the personal pre-tax income, the higher is the preferred tax rate and redistribution respectively.
One relevant drawback of the MRM is its assumption that elections are held continuously and individuals can thus react immediately to a changing income position. 6 In reality, elections follow a predefined cycle which forces individuals not only to consider their current but also their future income position. This fact is reflected by the Prospects of Upward Mobility (POUM) hypothesis originally developed by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) and formalized by Benabou and Ok (2001) . Alesina and Angeletos (2005, p . 900) propose a simplified two period nonlinear tax-benefit-system in which individuals are either tax payers or beneficiaries dependent on a specific income threshold. 7 A rational individual thus tries to maximize intertemporal net income which is determined by two factors: pre-tax income ( 1 i g y ) as well as either a payable tax deduction ( 1 i ψ ) or a granted benefit ( 1 i υ ) in period one and expected fu-4 Moreover, individuals have quasi-linear preferences and the real wages as well as the price are normalized to one for the sake of simplicity. 5 If it is assumed that median income is lower than the average income and that the median-voter is decisive, the inequality in the distribution of pre-tax incomes determines the amount of governmental redistribution. 6 Clearly there exist further restrictions to the MRM such as the one-person-one-vote assumption. However these points refer to the macroeconomic perspective of the MRM and are not directly relevant for the analysis of individuals' preferences for redistribution. For more information please refer to Borck and Rainald (2007) , Breyer and Ursprung (1998) and Harms and Zink (2003) . 7 This model is based on the assumption that expected future income is an increasing function of current income (i.e. concave) and that individuals are bounded risk averse. In addition, the structure of the tax-benefit-system once decided by elections cannot be revised permanently. 
leading to the conclusion that individuals oppose redistribution if they expect to move upwards sufficiently in income and are currently poor. Taking both periods into account they will be net losers of this redistributive system. This leads to the second hypothesis:
If an individual expects a higher future income, this individual demands less redistribution.
In contrast to the POUM hypothesis, which treats expectations about the future income position as relevant factor for individuals ' preferences, Piketty (1995) adopts the original idea of the tunnel effect formulated by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) and develops a rational learning model. This model describes how individuals assess their future opportunities. That is, varying attitudes towards redistribution can be attributed to diverging experiences in the past. Individuals who have experienced social upward mobility are convinced that personal effort will be rewarded and oppose extensive redistribution. According to this, expectations
2) are dependent on the experiences in the past.
HYPOTHESIS 3:
Individuals who have experienced upward mobility demand less redistribution.
Empirical Literature
There is growing empirical literature regarding the determinants of individuals' preferences for redistribution. Table A .4 in the appendix provides detailed information on various studies covering the effects of social mobility, some of which are now presented in more detail.
Starting with the POUM hypothesis, Rainer and Siedler (2008) find evidence -using data from the German SOEP for the year 2005 -that the expectation to receive a pay rise within 9 In contrast to studies with a microeconomic focus, contributions concentrating on the MRM on the macroeconomic level aim at explaining the level of redistribution by economic inequality. Support for the MRM hypothesis on the macro level can be found in Meltzer and Richard (1983) , Kenworthy and McCall (2008) or Milanovic (2000) whereas Rodriguez (1999) , Mello and Tiongson (2006) or Karabarbounis (2011) provide no evidence for the validity of this hypothesis. Thus the empirical literature is quite mixed. 10 Furthermore, a comparison with regard to education, occupational prestige or standard of living between an individual and his father is often applied.
the next two years has a strong negative effect on the demand for redistribution. Another study of Fong (2006) The second shortcoming is methodological. In general, studies going beyond purely survey based measures of attitudes towards redistribution are extremely rare. Although redistribution is modeled as the result of a voting mechanism in economic theory, empirical analyses at the micro level do not account for this interaction. The adequacy of the questions used to elicit individuals' preferences for redistribution typically applied in microeconometric studies is questioned (Fong 2006) as they are not able to predict individuals' decision making under the restriction of their budget constraint. In addition they fail as they do not impose trade-offs.
Thus, the prediction of the demand for redistribution is distorted because individuals do not take into account the consequences of their decisions with respect to their own income.
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With the exception of the studies of Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a; 2010b) and Neustadt (2011) , no study measuring the preferences for redistribution using a DCE exists. The authors underline the applicability of a DCE to elicit citizens' preferences. They find -among other results which will be discussed in detail in section 4 -that the average Swiss citizen has a preference for the current level of redistribution. In addition, their results are robust, highly significant and theoretically valid.
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, the paper aims at mitigating the aforementioned shortcomings by applying an advanced method and putting Germany in the spotlight.
Preferences for redistribution in Germany are elicited for the first time with the help of a DCE, based on a representative sample of 1,538 individuals. This method allows individuals to be forced to overcome trade-offs as well as to account for the underlying voting mechanism. Second, the Meltzer-Richard and social mobility hypotheses are revisited in line with the hypotheses developed in section 2.1 using this unique dataset. The results will contribute to the literature by giving new insights regarding preference heterogeneity with respect to economic self-interest and mobility.
Methods
Conceptional Framework
To analyze preferences for redistribution data are needed which allow the analysis of preferences for goods that are not traded in real economic markets. The data must reflect decisions between alternative, hypothetical redistribution systems. This can be achieved by using stated preference (SP) data. SP data are especially suited for forecasting individuals' decision making by revealing existing but not articulated preferences (see Louviere and Street 2000, pp. 22-25) . This concept is derived from traditional welfare economics and treats preferences as an attitude that can be made visible through choice experiments. A DCE is such a form of multi attribute valuation technique (see Bateman et al. 2002, p. 30) . Louviere and Woodworth (1983) as well as Louviere and Hensher (1982) developed the DCE in its current form that is based on decision theory and in line with the microeconomic utility theory. DCEs were first 11 Boeri et al. ((2001) ; (2002)) stands out, as they try to overcome these problems using Contingent Valuation Method (CVM). Their analyses focus on the attitudes towards redistribution with regard to pension and unemployment schemes. Their approach allows the explicit inclusion of trade-offs between income and social insurance coverage. One shortcoming of this approach is that it holds all attributes of the product "pension reform" constant, only varying its price. In contrast, a DCE is able to reflect trade-offs between all attributes.
applied in environment and transportation economics and since the middle of the 1990s also in health economics (see for example Bekker-Grob et al. 2012 ).
A DCE is based upon a characteristics approach which has its theoretical underpinning in the new demand theory of Lancaster (1966) . Lancaster suggests that individuals' utility is not derived from goods per se. Instead, the new consumer approach assumes that individuals benefit from the characteristics (or attributes) which goods have. 12 In its special form, individuals taking part in a DCE take a discrete decision and choose only one option or good respectively.
Each good is characterized through the relevant attributes as well as the desired attribute levels that affect individuals' utility (see Louviere and Street 2000, p. 2). Thus, an individual i maximizes his utility over a combination of attributes z. As one good j can consist of various characteristics, the combination of the characteristics vector b j and the quantity indicator x j (attribute levels) results in z j , i.e. the bundle of characteristics of good j (Lancaster 1971, pp. 21-24) . 12 The Lancastrian consumer approach is conform to neoclassic utility theory regarding the form and shape of the utility function. Thus, the axioms of transitivity, completeness, continuity and concavity also hold. The only difference to traditional neoclassic utility theory is its focus on characteristics rather than goods in general (Lancaster 1971, p. 20) .
Together with eq. (3.2) this leads to the indirect (conditional) utility function of individual i,
The utility function consists of the price of the respective alternative p l , the If a baseline alternative is included -i.e. typically the status quo S -a rational individual will only choose a proposed alternative B if this alternative offers a higher utility than the status quo. If at the same time the individual chooses status quo S rather than alternative A, the individuals' indifference curve must be located between A and B (see Pfarr 2013, p. 112; Vroomen and Zweifel 2011, p. 89) . In the course of the experiment, each respondent has to make repeated choices with varying alternatives, which allows the estimation of the individual indifference curve. In this context, it is very important that the individual is driven to "jump back and forth" between the different alternatives indicating a higher or lower utility level (see Zweifel et al. 2010, p. 4) . As the slope of the indifference curve is 14 That is the MWTP of individual i for an additional unit of n b expressed in units of individuals' income. This measure of preferences will be applied in section 4.
As individuals' utility cannot be directly observed, utility is a latent construct. Thus, an error term il ε is added to the indirect utility function of individual i, which is due to the fact that there are attributes or motives that cannot be observed but are nevertheless important for individuals' decision making. According to the Random Utility Theory (see McFadden (1974; 1981) and Manski (1977) ) the utility function is stochastic and additively split in a deterministic observable part () l w  and a stochastic component il ε :
Therefore, only the probability il P of individual i choosing alternative l rather than j can be estimated (see Louviere and Street 2000, p. 53 ).
This estimated probability indicates individuals' decision making and corresponds to their demand for a given redistributive system expressed by choosing one of the proposed options.
These options, i.e. status quo and one alternative, reflect the possible supply of redistribution.
Thus, by means of this experiment, the voting mechanism is captured through the DCE. Furthermore, with the incorporation of the price attribute p l which should indicate the personal contribution for a given redistributive system, the budget constraint is imposed. In this way, the experimental setting is able to reflect the underlying voting mechanism and to overcome the previously mentioned shortcomings.
Implementation and Survey Design
A DCE measures preferences over attributes in hypothetical decision situations. Therefore, an experimental design is required which incorporates the relevant attributes affecting individuals' utility. The underlying experimental design was developed according to the procedure presented in Bateman et al. (2002, p. 258 In a second step, the levels of the attributes were defined. They should be sufficiently wide to make respondents indeed "jump" between the status quo and an alternative redistributive scheme. Also, it should be possible to contrast an increase in the level of one attribute by a decline in the level of another attribute. That is, respondents should be forced to overcome trade-offs (cf. Bateman et al. 2002, p. 260; Telser 2002, p. 39) . First, the levels of the status quo were defined. Following this, possible alternative levels for each attribute were assigned.
To obtain meaningful results the attribute levels not only have to be plausible and realistic but also have to reflect the broad range of individuals' preferences. Regarding the complexity, the number of chosen attribute levels should be limited. Table 1 represents the attributes and their respective levels.
In the next steps, the design and the visual presentation of the DCE had to be considered. The complete factorial design -containing all possible combinations of attributes and their levels -results in a total of 129,600 combinations (alternatives) that cannot be realized in an experiment. By using the program gosset to apply a D-optimal design (see Kanninen 2002 , Kuhfeld 2006 18 , the number of alternatives could be restricted to 49 and were split into seven groups. 19 Each respondent is confronted with one of these groups (see figure 2). To control for errors in decision making, one alternative was included twice in each of the seven groups, resulting in 8 binary choices per respondent. 18 While the D-optimality was developed essentially for linear estimation models, Carson et al. (1994) suggest that the application for non-linear models such as probit or logit is also possible.
19 Bech et al. (2011) shows that the cognitive burden increases in the number of choice sets. Nevertheless, exposing respondents up to 17 choice-sets is manageable and respondents can handle it without problems. 20 More information is available upon request. experiment is complemented by a socio-demographic questionnaire covering the relevant individual characteristics to test the hypotheses developed in section 2.
The choice experiment as well as the survey was conducted by computer assisted personal interviews in February 2012 with a total of 1,538 representatively selected individuals in Germany.
Econometric specification
During the course of the underlying choice experiment each respondent chooses between the status quo and an alternative redistributive scheme by maximizing his utility according to equation (3.6). In this context, only the probability il P of individual i choosing alternative l rather than j can be estimated. This probability is equal to the probability that differences between the error terms ( ij il εε  )
are dominated by differences in the deterministic component ( () albeit its very restrictive implications of a constant marginal utility. Pekelman and Sen (1979) as well as Gegax and Stanley (1997) 
Empirical Analysis
Data
In February 2012, the survey was conducted by a market research institute with a total of 1,538 respondents. The sample representatively reflects the German population that is eligible to vote regarding the criteria age, gender, family status, education and income position. Each respondent had to choose 8 times between the status quo and an alternative, resulting in a total of 1,538*8=12,304 decisions. Table 2 reflects the total number as well as the percentage of choices at the top of the table. According to this, about 34 % of the decisions were made in favor of an alternative. Obviously, the chosen attribute levels have caused the respondents to switch. A higher number of decisions for an alternative allow the approximation of the indifference curve more accurately. Looking at the control questions, the test revealed that about 13 % of the respondents were inconsistent in decision making. While the inconsistency is somewhat higher in a comparable DCE for Switzerland (14 %, Neustadt and Zweifel 2010a), the presented ratio is next to the lower limit of other studies, stating percentages from 9 % to 39 % (Phillips et al. 2002) . With a more detailed look at the number of chosen alternatives, only around 8 % of the individuals never chose an alternative (see the bottom of table 2). An accumulation can be found for two (and three) chosen alternatives per respondent. That is, about 20 % (24 %) of the respondents were caused to leave the status quo two (three) times since from their point of view the respective alternatives offered a higher utility than the status quo.
For the empirical testing of the MRM (H 1), the existing literature uses various proxies (see section 2).
As the aim is to analyze the MRM in its original form, individuals' monthly gross income is used (GI). Moreover, as income is typically prone to missing values, a variable covering individuals' self-positioning on a social distance scale (SC) is additionally tested.
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In the sample, a proportion of about 11 % of individuals' gross income is missing which is relatively small compared to similar national surveys (see Essig and Winter 2009) . Table 3 describes in detail how the variables are constructed. 21 In addition to these two variables, the effect of household net income as well as of individuals' education is also controlled for. The results support the findings presented in the following section. These results are available upon request. GI is divided into seven binary income categories which represent the relative income position of the individual to the mean (see Statistisches Bundesamt and Wissenschaftszentrum
Berlin für Sozialforschung 2011, p. 164). Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the seven income categories. As GI I and GI II reflect the bottom of the income distribution, i.e. less than 75 % of mean income, the share of these two categories amounts to 45 %. In contrast, GI VII forms the top of the income distribution with more than 200 % of the mean. Variables GI III and GI IV are the middle categories with 75 % to 100 % and 100 % to 125 % respectively.
Just as the classification of GI, individual's self-positioning is also clustered into seven categories (see table 3 ). SC I forms the lowest social class and SC VII represents individuals rating themselves into one of the two top social classes. This table clearly shows that the share of individuals rating themselves in the two bottom categories of social status is lower compared to the income categories. Furthermore, the correlation between GI and SC is very small. This implies that individuals are less likely to rate themselves in a social class according to their income position.
To test the POUM-hypothesis (H 2), two specifications are used. First, an individual's expectation of his future income position (gross) and second, an individual's assessment of his fu-ture social status. If individuals' expected income or social status is higher than their present one, this is interpreted as upward mobility and vice versa. In cases in which the expected status equals the current status, no mobility expectations are assumed. This strategy to cover mobility expectations can also be found in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Fong (2006) . The proxies applied to investigate the effects of past mobility experiences (Piketty, H 3) are similar to the ones presented above. Individuals' past income as well as social mobility is also taken into account. Individuals who stated a lower income or social status five (ten) years ago are assumed to have upward mobility experiences and vice versa. The descriptive statistics for these two groups of variables is provided in table 5. About 42 % of the respondents have experienced upward income mobility whereas only about 32 % have experienced that their social status has improved. The majority of German citizens report having experienced neither upward nor downward income mobility or social mobility within the last ten years. Thus, the figure for experienced mobility is about the same as for expected mobility. The proportion of missing values for experienced mobility in personal income is somewhat lower compared to GI. Obviously, more respondents were able to report their gross income five years ago than their expected gross income. 
Meltzer-Richard-Hypothesis
Each dummy variable covering a single income category (GI I to GI VII) has to be interacted with the two attributes of interest, i.e. RE (redistribution) and TC (tax and contribution) as well as with their quadratic terms to define the socio-demographic characteristics alternative specific (as described in section 3.3). Only then, statements about whether individuals within the bottom income category exhibit a higher or lower preference for redistribution than individuals in another category can be made. Representatively for the subsequent procedure, the approach applied for the first income category GI I is discussed.
In a first step, the full model (eq. A study applying a similar approach for Switzerland questions the validity of the MRM, too. Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a) find that individuals within the lowest income category exhibit the lowest MWTP for redistribution.
The results for the second proxy applied (SC) show a similar pattern. MWTP is first decreasing the closer to the mean and is increasing the more individuals' social status exceeds the mean. Hence, individuals grouping themselves in a lower social category have a higher preference for redistribution than individuals belonging to the middle class. Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a) show that Swiss citizens of the highest social class state the highest MWTP. In this case these findings support the results presented in this paper.
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Summarizing, the empirical evidence presented in part contradicts the underlying theory.
Thus, Hypothesis 1 has to be rejected. Initially, preference for redistribution is decreasing with increasing income as expected. The more individuals' income or social status exceeds the mean, preference for redistribution is once again increasing rather than decreasing. Among the classification presented in the paper, other specifications of the income or social categories are tested. All of these estimates strongly support the results presented. The empirical procedure is analogue to the one adopted for the MRM hypothesis. Table 6 shows the result for expected future income mobility. Individuals expecting upward income mobility exhibit significantly lower support for governmental redistribution (MWTP 0.483) than individuals expecting no mobility at all (MWTP 0.618). However, this result is only statistically significant at the 10 % level. No significant differences can be found between individuals with no and downward mobility expectations. Expected upward mobility therefore reduces individuals' preferences for redistribution. This result is in line with Hypothesis 2. Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a) present results in contradiction to the POUM hypothesis. Swiss citizens expecting no future upward or downward mobility in income are the least willing to pay for redistribution.
Referring to expected self-positioning on a social distance scale, Summarizing, the empirical evidence only weakly supports the POUM hypothesis for Germany. Nevertheless, Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. German citizens expecting increasing incomes are supposedly less supportive of the welfare state. This result is in line with the existing literature that confirms a negative effect of expected upward mobility on preferences for redistribution.
In contrast to the POUM hypothesis, Piketty's learning model concentrates on mobility in the past. Hence, experienced upward mobility dampens individuals' support for redistribution.
According to the specifications above, two proxies are applied to investigate the effects of Piketty's learning model for German citizens: past mobility in income ( 
Concluding Remarks
This study focuses on the determinants of individuals' preferences for redistribution. In detail, traditional economic theory suggests that individuals' income position as well as expected and experienced mobility may be relevant for individuals' decisions concerning the extent of the welfare state. In contrast to the existing literature, this contribution chooses an advanced methodology which allows the use of individuals' decisions under the restrictions of their budget constraint. Thereby it is possible to predict individuals' preferences and therefore the voting behavior more realistically. As a result, the contribution of this study is twofold. First, the paper aims at eliciting preferences for redistribution in Germany with the help of a DCE, based on a representative sample of 1,538 individuals. Second, the Meltzer-Richard and the social mobility hypotheses are revisited. The unique dataset allows the solving of the problems mentioned above as the respondents were forced to overcome trade-offs. In addition the methodology applied is able to reflect the underlying voting mechanism of redistribution.
The results provided in this paper are quite mixed. The Melter-Richard-Model finds no support from the data for Germany. In contrast to the theoretical implications, individuals' preferences for redistribution are increasing rather than decreasing the higher their personal income. This suggests that individuals' attitudes are not purely economic self-interest. Moreover, the empirical evidence substantiates the theoretical predictions of Piketty's learning model. The empirical evidence strongly suggests that individuals who have experienced upward mobility in the past exhibit less supportive preferences for redistribution. Thus, while Hypothesis 1 must be rejected, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected.
The adequacy of the proposed DCE is contingent upon two aspects: First, the extent to which hypothetical decisions are able to approximate real decisions. Second, whether the respondents were able to deal with the decision situation, understand the experiment and finally reveal their true preferences. These aspects must be discussed and analyzed critically. However, the comparable study of Neustadt and Zweifel 2010a as well as continuative analyses of the validity of the underlying DCE strongly suggest that this experiment is free from distortions and is able to reliably measure the preferences of German citizens for redistribution.
Concluding, economic factors might only explain parts of individuals' preferences. Particularly the impact of behavioral factors must be investigated prospectively. The underlying dataset also offers this opportunity. 
